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Crisis

by Francis A. Allen
Edson R. Sunderland Professor of Law
The University of Michigan
These remarks were delivered at the special convocation
commemorating the opening of the Begbie Building,
University of Victoria, November 1980.

As a schoolboy I was taught that a public speaker ought
not to confess uncertainties about his talk to the audience;
the reason given was that doubts are contagious and
ventilating them may forfeit the confidence of his listeners.
• Especially, I was warned, he ought not to begin his remarks
in this way. Not for the first time I propose to disregard good
advice. In thinking about these comments in the weeks just
past, two concerns recurred; I should like to confess them at
the outset, not for the good of my soul but in aid of
understanding. Fiq;t, I am acutely aware that the
experience from which I speak differs in many important
particulars from your own. Most of my mature life has been
involved in legal education as a student and as a teacher;
but the experience is one almost wholly confined to the
United States. It is a propensity of my fellow-countrymen, I
am afraid , to assume that the American experience should
be accepted as normative for all of mankind (a tendency
which may be weakening, however, under the pressure of
modern realities). I do not suppose that my observations,
which are in part the product of a particular experience,
will speak directly to your problems. I hope that some of
what I have to say will spark recognition, or at least that it
may possess for you a quaint anthropological interest. This
is my hope but I cannot be sure.
Second, there is the matter of tone. This convocation is
above all a festive occasion. Yet efforts to discuss
institutional performance and aspirations in the broader
context of the late twentieth-century world seem often to
strike rather somber notes. I am reminded of the story of the
don in an English university who one evening at dinner
visited the decanter of port rather too frequently and
avidly. He reeled his way home, and as he squatted on the
stoop, vainly attempting to open the front door by inserting
a match box into the lock, was heard muttering, "Damn the
nature of things!" There have been times in the past weeks
when I feared that this imprecation might be taken as
constituting the theme of my remarks. Such is not my
intention, for in fact I am hopeful about the future of legal
education, persuaded of its importance, and confident
about the distinguished future of this school.
Coming from a clerical family background I have a
tendency to seek out texts for my remarks. The statement
25

that I have chosen today is taken from the scriptures of
Dean Christopher Columbus Langdell of Harvard, the
inventor of the case method of legal instruction. In 1886 he
wrote : "If law be not a science, a university will best
consult its dignity in declining to teach it. If it be not a
science, it is a species of handicraft, and may best be
learned by serving an apprenticeship to one who
practices." For some this may seem a curious text upon
which to base a modern discussion of legal education; it is
certainly in many respects a defective one. I know of no one
who today accepts Langdell's version of law-as-science, and
there surely must be few who concur with his apparent
assumptions about the nature of science. Yet Dean
Langdell's statement encompasses an assertion that retains
a high relevance almost a century after it was made. It is
that one cannot proclaim that law studies are appropriately
included in the curricula of universities without accepting
certain necessary implications about the nature and
obligations of university-based legal education. In my
country, at least, the failure of some members of the bench
and bar and of some persons in the universities themselves
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a conflict of interest, let us face it, between training people
for a career and the creation of scholarly knowledge."
Perhaps one ought not to object too strenuously that the
writer is here pulling a thoroughly familiar rabbit out of his
hat. The tension to which he adverts is well known to all
persons thoughtful about professional education of all sorts.
Yet the tension is felt more acutely today than at any time in
my recollection and perhaps at any time since university
law schools became the dominant mode of professional
legal training. The problems it engenders can no longer be
submerged and half-forgotten; they have surfaced and
insistently demand attention. A new dialogue is now in
progress. Much depends on how intelligently and with what
restraint the dialogue is conducted.
For my first proposition let me return to the assertion that
I derive from Dean Langdell: The very presence of the law
schools in the universities entails certain necessary
implications about the nature and obligations of legal
education. What are these implications? First and foremost,
that the law school being part of the university must
advance the general purposes of the university. This, of
course, is not to deny that the law school has its own
distinctive purposes to achieve. It is to say that there is no
moral or other justification for a failure of legal education
to contribute significantly to the purposes and functions of
the larger institution of which it is a part. And what are the
general purposes of the university? I shall not rashly
attempt a comprehensive statement, but at the least we
might agree that they include the discovery of new
knowledge ; the organization and communication of existing
knowledge; the identification, analysis, and criticism of
values; and the cultivation of aesthetic sensibility. The law
schools, if they are to perform their missions as integral
. parts of universities, are required to give greater attention
to the means for discovery of new knowledge . Social
changes affect the nature of the knowledge that is relevant
to law teaching and legal scholarship ; and methods of
knowledge-discovery that served reasonably well in the
past do not suffice today. As someone has said, it is no
longer true that the fully-equipped legal scholar is one
possessing a supply of 4" by 6 file cards and a desk in a
library of statutes and case reports. Understanding
sophisticated methods of fact-finding and analysis devised
in other departments of the university has become a
requisite for many important kinds of legal inquiry and,
indeed, of law practice. The anarchy of values that
characterizes the times requires the legal scholar to
traverse bodies of knowledge outside the law-history,
ethics, philosophy, social theory-as he attempts to
understand the conflicts of values now being fought out in
the legal arena, and as he seeks to formulate a workable
body of postulates and premises upon which to erect a
modern structure of law. Being part of the university
dictates certain obligations for the law school, and in
attempting to fulfill them, legal scholarship is drawn ever
more deeply into the central intellectual currents of
university life.
The new awareness and involvements of legal scholars in
the intellectual life of universities is not to be explained
solely, however, by reference to an obligation of law
schools to do their fair share in advancing the universities'
general purposes. There are other bases for these
involvements that are at least as palpable and perhaps
more peremptory. I shall discuss two of them : first,
widespread and dominant notions about the proper
functions of law; and second, certain changes that have
occurred in the social roles of the traditional professions,
including the legal profession. I have just suggested that law
schools are moving to new forms of research, teaching, and
speculation, in part because of the dominance of certain
ideas about the proper functions of law. Anyone attempting
11

to perceive these implications threatens a crisis in legal
education. The causes, however, have deeper roots. The
law schools are caught up in the wider crisis that today
engulfs humanistic education of all kinds.
It may be well for us to recall that despite the presence of
legal studies in the universities of the western world for
nearly a millenium, there are and have always been those
who view university-based legal education with much
skepticism and little enthusiasm. "For better or worse,"
writes the economist Paul A. Samuelson, "the American
law school has wormed its way into a corner of the
university campus." Professor Samuelson's statement
demonstrates, among other things, that even a Nobel
Laureate may sometimes lose control of his verbs. My
experience as an officer of the Association of American
Law Schools in the 1970s suggests that the problem in the
recent past is not one of law schools' "worming their way"
into the groves of academe , but rather the practices of some
university administrations of creating new law schools or
exploiting old schools as sources of financial support for
university purposes wholly distinct from legal education.
Later in his essay Professor Samuelson observes: "There is
26
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to trace the course of American legal thought in the
twentieth century will almost certainly assign great
significance to the emergence of realist jurisprudence,
principally in the years between the two world wars. There
may well be sharp disagreements among the intellectual
historians about what realist jurisprudence is or was, what
it achieved, or whether its consequences have been good or
bad; but its importance is likely to be conceded by nearly
all. One of the secure legacies of realist jurisprudence is the
assumption, widely held, that law is an instrument for
achieving social purposes that can be identified, analyzed,
advanced, or rejected. One wonders whether there has
been any time since the eighteenth-century Enlightenment
when this assumption was wholly rejected. But if there was
ever a period when construction of elaborate structures of
judicial precedent and demonstration of the historical
authenticity of legal doctrine were thought to constitute the
entire domain and function of legal thought, that time is
now irrevocably past. The late Karl Llewellyn's statement
of the matter enunciates not only the view of realist
jurisprudence, but also that of most modern men and
women who have formed opinions about the functions of
law. Law, according to Llewellyn, should be conceived of as
"a means to social ends and not ... an end in itself." It
follows that "any part needs constantly to be examined for
its purpose, and for its effect, and to be judged in the light of
both and of their relation to each other."
How is this examination and judging to be achieved? It is
at this point that many of the realist writers become most
elusive and least helpful. The realists did not leave a
literature rich in suggestions about achieving the realist
agenda; and the law schools have moved only haltingly
along the path. Yet if it be assumed, as we very largely do
assume, that the serious study of law is in some significant

part a study of public policy-what it is and what it ought to
be-then it behooves us to cultivate the arts and sciences
necessary to the study of public policy. Traditional modes
of legal research are surely not irrelevant even to this sort
of enterprise, but they are insufficient. It follows that the
ideal of law as public policy may steer us, however slowly,
to those departments of the university in which
methodologies for the study and evaluation of public policy
have long been developing. The notion of law as means
rather than end, therefore, guides us into more intimate
intellectual relations with the university.
I have also suggested that certain changes in the social
roles of the traditional professions-law, medicine, and the
clergy-have contributed to the same end. From the
beginning of the modern era and even before, western
societies have referred most questions requiring more than
ordinary knowledge and judgment to one or the other of the
classic professions for answers. Questions about the soul,
the cause of disease, the rights of persons caught up in
property disputes, or about the extent of governmental
powers were submitted to the priest, the physician, or the
lawyer for authoritative resolution. Before the end of the
last century, however, the hegemony of the older
professions was considerably weakened. This is not to say
that their authority was destroyed or their prestige ended. It
is to say that members of the traditional professions like the
law are today required to share authority and prestige with
the practitioners of other and newer disciplines. Much of
this change stems from new knowledge, most of it
discovered and cultivated in universities, that offers more
penetrating explanations of conditions and events than the
traditional professions were able to supply. So long as the
physical condition of the human organism was thought to
stem from the operation of fluxes and vapors within the
27

body, there was little point in looking beyond the medical
practitioner for explanations of the causes of disease and its
cure. At the point, however, that health is seen as
dependent in part on the workings of microscopic
organisms, the physician must share authority for
responding to fundamental questions about health and
disease with the bacteriologist and the virologist. So also,
issues of criminal responsibility will be viewed as falling
largely within the province of judges and lawyers as long as
the human being is seen as morally autonomous and in
possession of perfect freedom of choice. With the rise of
theories of social causation of crime or of genetic or
psychological conditioning of human behavior, the door
must be opened, for better or worse, to the practitioners of
the sociological, biological, and psychological disciplines.
In many instances the newer disciplines are not only
cultivating areas of general interest to the law, but those of
central concern. Being aware of this cultivation, to
paraphrase Mr. Justice Holmes, is for legal education not a
duty; it is merely a necessity. Again, because of these events
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the intellectual bonds attaching legal education to the
universities have been strengthened.
Consequences follow from the bonding of law schools
and universities, from conceiving of legal education as
something more than mere handicraft. One of the
consequences is that legal education falls heir to the
modern crises afflicting humanistic education of all sorts. I
hope that my characterizing of legal education as
humanistic will not be thought strange or controversial, but
perhaps the point deserves some explicit attention. In 1930
the critic Lionel Trilling wrote: "[The) function [of literary
art] is ultimately the social and moral one of discovering
and judging values." I am not qualified to determine how
satisfactorily this observation defines the purposes of
literature (and it has been challenged by other critics as
insufficient); but I believe that the statement may be taken
as a useful working description of much huIIJanistic
education, including humanistic legal education. Law
school education and research is or ought to be preoccupied
with values. We do or ought continually to ask not only
"how to do it," but "why we do it" and "ought we to do it at
all." There are few departments of the university in which
28

such questions are so much a part of the daily grist as the
law schools. The reason why it is important that such
questions be asked is not simply that we are under
obligation to be critics of the law and its institutions. We are
under that obligation, and the law school's role as critic of
the law, and, indeed, at times of the legal profession, is one
of its most important social functions. If it is inadequately
performed by the law schools, it will be performed by
others; and there is no assurance that the criticism of the
others will be as informed or as relevant. There is another
reason for legal education's concern with values, however:
such concern is essential to the understanding of law. How
can law be "known" in any fundamental sense apart from
its purposes? And how can the future development of the
law be anticipated except by reference to how well these
purposes are being achieved and how acceptable they
remain to the wider society as the community's needs and
perceptions change? Concern with values is thus far from
being merely of academic interest. On the contrary, it goes
to the very essence of technical professional competence.
These facts have long been understood by the best legal
practitioners. It is important that we do not forget what our
best lawyers discovered long ago.
The burden of practicing and defending humanistic
education in these times, however, is a heavy one. The load
is perhaps especially weighty for law schools. The
difficulties do not stem entirely from the modern mood of
disillusion and skepticism that demands instantaneous
payoffs and hence imperils humanistic values which reach
their goals slowly and circuitously. The "quiet crisis" in
humanistic legal education to which I refer in my title,
derives more fundamentally from the circumstance that
such education deals in values at a time when social values
are in a disarray approaching anarchy. This disarray, this
' dissolving of the older categories, presents extraordinary
difficulties for the legal discipline which by its nature is
importantly engaged in searching out a consensus of values
sufficient to support the means necessary and the stability
indispensable to achieving a wide range of social
requirements. Nor should the proliferation of law in our
times be permitted to obscure the underlying disarray of
values. In the United States-I must be especially careful
here not to generalize beyond my experience and
knowledge-the modern proliferation of law, the expansion
of law in old areas and its penetration to fields not
heretofore subject to legal regulation, often reflects not a
consensus of values but its opposite. Much of the new law
has been made at the instigation of special-interest groups
eager to immunize their interests from the normal workings
of democratic politics or from traditional forms of
discretion exercised in families, the schools, and the
market.
A few months ago at lunch, the dean of my law school
observed that in his years in legal education he had never
known a time when there was so little agreement among
faculty members about what constitutes good academic
work. My tenure in the law schools (I am sorry to record) is
considerably longer than that of Dean Sandalow, but I
believe that his observation corresponds also to my
experience. The disagreements go much beyond such gross
categories as "practice-oriented" versus " theoretical"
training, clinical education versus traditional classroom
instruction, doctrinal versus empirical research. These
controversies, of course, abound; but even among persons
dedicated to highly theore tical legal scholarship there is
dispute abou t the premises upon which the work is to
proceed, the values to be advanced, and the me thodology to
be employed. How are these acute disparities of judgment
about what is good or bad, important or trivial, useful or
useless, to be exp'lained? Surely fundamental explanations
require that we peer over the boundaries of legal education

and of the legal profession into the society of which law and
law schools are parts. If we do this we are likely to detect
the relationship between the conflicts agitating legal
education and the larger contention of values that pervades
all aspects of modern western culture. Among the factors
most seriously limiting the usefulness of much modern
criticism of legal education are the failures to perceive or
even to look for this relationship and the apparent
assumption that legal education can be understood and
reformed as a thing apart from the intellectual and social
world in which it is located.
Efforts to pursue humanistic legal education give rise to
dilemmas and difficulties. Not all of them are of earthshaking seriousness. One development entitled to passing
notice is the increasing length of leading articles and
student notes in American law reviews, a disease not yet
manifested in quite so virulent a form, I believe, in the
Canadian journals. The one-hundred twenty page article
about equally divided between text and footnotes is not
quite the norm in my country, but it is not uncommon. What
are the causes of this new giganticism in legal writing? It
must certainly be conceded that in some instances the
length of the articles is justified and reflects new
aspirations and methodologies in legal scholarship. It
reveals the view of law as public policy, referred to earlier,
and the recruitment of scholarly resources of a kind not
often exploited in earlier legal writing. This, of course, is
not the whole story. In some cases the extraordinary length
and complexity of the writing is a direct product of the
confusion of values just mentioned. If, as is often true, a set
of premises must be fashioned and defended before an
argument can be advanced, if one cannot assume common
ground at the starting point, then length and complexity are
likely to be attributes of the writing.
Some of the difficulties of pursuing a discipline much
implicated in values at a time when values are volatile and
unstable take on an even more somber tone. Uncongenial
and intractable social realities may tempt legal scholarship
into maneuvers of escape. One evidence of this may be the
rise of a legal literature directed primarily to how questions
are to be thought about rather than how they are to be
answered. How modern questions are to be thought about
is, of course, a profoundly important matter; and I
challenge neither the legitimacy nor the necessity for such
concerns, particularly in these times. There is a danger,
however , that our insecurity about ends as well as means
may lure us into a kind of Byzantine embroidering of
intellectual technique. The present disposition toward
elaborate model-building may at times reveal this
propensity. The technique has recently been caustically
described by Professor Franklin Zimring: "Step One, make
up a world. Step Two, make up a set of laws consistent with
the world you have made up during Step One. The results
are tidy ... , but this process is either an amusement-a
form of jurisprudential chess-or an exercise in selfdeception." I also believe that in many areas of social and
legal concern Professor Zimring may be right in suggesting
that our better course is to pursue a policy of rigorous
muddling through-" muddling through" because we cannot
anticipate all the realities actually to be encountered by
simply constructing in advance a body of postulates or
hypotheses; "rigorous" because we are under obligation to
search out conscientiously whatever alternatives of policy
are actually available to us, to state as carefully as may be
the reasons for preferring certain alternatives over others
and the degree of our confidence in such choices. Not only
is the temptation to escape reality through the exaltation of
technique fatal to our capacities for adequate social
response, it contains the immediate peril of alienating legal
scholars and scholarship from their base in the legal
profession. I do not challenge the propriety of opening the

doors of law schools to scholars trained in the assumptions
and techniques of other disciplines. Nor do I have anything
but admiration for the self-education of many law
professors in other fields of learning perceived by them to
be of relevance to their teaching and scholarship. But I have
sensed a danger that some of our bright young teachers may
fall into a kind of limbo in which they are no longer quite
lawyers but are also not quite philosophers or behavioral
scientists. I see no benefit whatever in adding the law
schools to the procession of those other university
departments that appear to be engaged in a wistful search
for a subject matter.
I must take care to be understood at this point. I am saying
that if we are committed to treat law studies as something
more than a species of handicraft, we are then called upon
to confront a spectrum of problems very much like those
being faced by other disciplines that are also intellectually
based and humanistically motivated. That humanistic
education of all sorts is hard pressed in the last quarter of
the twentieth century, that it is beset by fiscal constraints,
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skepticism, and temptations, is surely no justification for
abandoning the goals and methods of such education. On
the contrary, that teaching and research significantly
occupied with the identification and analysis of values is
under siege in these times is perhaps one measure of the
great contemporary need for education based on
humanistic assumptions. Insofar as legal education is
concerned, I can think of no greater tragedy than that the
pressures of modern events and attitudes should weaken
our commitments to the humanistic ideal and induce us to
accept a regime of narrow vocationalism, a regime directed
to the goal of what a former colleague of mine described as
"instantaneous practicality."
My last comment suggests a query that a number of you
may have been chafing to put to me for some time. I shall
state the point as fairly as I can. Even conceding, you may
wish to say, that law schools have obligations deriving from
their nature as parts of universities, that they have public
responsibilities as critics of the law and legal institutions,
that legal teaching and scholarship are of necessity
concerned with public policy and its effectuation in many
areas, these obligations do not and cannot exhaust the
29

agenda of legal education. For the law school, although part
of the university, is a professional school. As such it must be
concerned with the competency of its students to deal with
the needs of their future clients, some of whose needs may
be of wide soci~l significance but many of which are of
importance largely to the clients themselves. Law schools
also owe obligations to the courts and to the other agencies
of justice. Graduates lacking in basic competence are not
only a menace to their clients but also constitute a burden
on the institutions of justice and an impediment to the
performance of their proper social functions. Before ending
the list, which might be much longer, one may wish to add
that the law schools owe obligations to their students. These
students are not going to sit atop pillars in a desert for the
next 50 years engaged in philosophical contemplation. They
are, on the contrary, soon to be plunged into the practice of
law, and will be swept up in what is often a bruising,
competitive, and demanding regimen. It would be nice
(students tell me) if the law schools could do something
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more to sustain them in the hard pull ahead and even
contribute to their making a living!
It is vital, it seems to me, that those who defend the
humanistic ideal in legal education should give the closest
and most sympathetic attention to these considerations. In
the United States and, I gather, also in Canada, voices both
within and outside the profession are being raised to urge
that more effective means be devised to enhance the
competency of young lawyers and that new attention be
given to what is sometimes called skills training. It would be
folly for the law schools to ignore these demands for they
express felt needs. Perceptions of this sort can be
disregarded by legal education only at its peril.
Despite the evident skepticism of such observers as
Professor Samuelson, whom I quoted earlier, I have no
doubt that the essential needs for improved instruction in
practical lawyer skills can be accommodated to an
educational regime founded on the humanistic ideal. I am
not making a forecast. I do not say that this accommodation
will of necessity occur, only that it can occur. Questions of
specific content and modes of instruction are, of course, not
irrelevant to the advancement of humanistic legal

30

education, but more important than these are matters of
motivation, spirit, and breadth. There is nothing
particularly elevating about traditional classroom
instruction that aspires only to assist students in obtaining
licensure. And there may be much that is humane and
liberating about clinical instruction that aims at something
more than elaborating the niceties of professional practice.
It is possible, too, that certain kinds of skills training will
enhance the intellectual content of the law school
experience rather than detracting from it. Such training can
contribute a basis for understanding and evaluating the
other parts of the curriculum, of strengthening the
command of reality which is a leading attribute of sound
professional training.
Our dedication to the reality principle should warn us,
however, that the reconciliation of humanistic legal
education with demands advanced under the rubric of
competency may be no simple or certain thing. Indeed, it
seems to me, a diminishment of the humanistic impulse is
very nearly inevitable unless our will is strong and our
judgment clear. The difficulties begin in the inability of
some sincere judicial and practitioner reformers of legal
education even to perceive that perils exist. "Competency"
is surely an end to be desired; who would enter the lists
flying the banner of incompetency? But perils unforeseen
often threaten greatest harm. Some lurk in the efforts to
define the concept of competency. There is no single
lawyers' skill; there are many. Skills vital in some types of
practice play no role in others. There is danger that our
definitions may be insufficiently inclusive. Thus a group of
judges and practitioners urging greater attention to
litigation skills issued a report a few years ago making a
slighting reference to a seminar in economic theory being
offered in one of our national law schools. Yet for many
• professionals a working command of certain kinds of
economic theory is today one of the most important of the
lawyer skills both in their in-court and out-of-court practice.
There may be a tendency for some persons to acknowledge
and then promptly forget that central to any meaningful
concept of competency are the basic humanistic skills of
reading, writing, and reasoning, as well as the vital capacity
to perceive the purposes and values that the law expresses
or ought to express. I do not wish to convert this recital into
a litany, but permit me one further observation. Most of us
who are members of the legal profession are disposed to do
nothing by halves. We are self-selected to reveal this trait.
Most of us, whether we know it or not, are better at
advocating a cause or promoting an enthusiasm than at
balancing competing values to achieve a harmonious whole .
By the nature of things, those who would reform legal
education from outside the law schools may experience
particular difficulties in achieving this balance. The danger
is that sincere and able professionals may be disposed to
impose rigid requirements with reference to course content
or mode of instruction on the law schools with little thought
about or ability to estimate the impact of such requirements
on the schools' ability to achieve their other numerous and
vital goals. Some years ago when I was so unfortunate as to
be a law school dean, I divided our organization of visiting
alumni into smaller groups corresponding to the various
divisions of our curriculum. There were groups devoted to
our corporate courses, trusts and real property, public law,
procedure, and the like. Members of each group were
invited to study the offerings in the segment of the
curriculum to which they were assigned and to make
recommendations for improvement. On the morning when
all of the groups reported their findings, the alumni were
interested to discover that if all their recommendations
were to be implemented, our three-year course of
professional instruction would have to be extended to

something over nine years. Perhaps the story contains a
moral.
I have rather the feeling at this point that I have our
heroine, legal education, strapped firmly to the rails with
the locomotive, symbolizing a collection of disasters,
bearing down upon her. It would be pleasant to leap upon
the scene and in one dramatic gesture sever the cords and
overcome the peril. Dramatic gestures seem in short supply
in this era; in any event, I have none to offer. What, then, is
the course for legal education in an age when the ground
seems to shift under our feet, and what are its prospects?
Specifically, what path should be blazed by this young law
school possessed of an able and dedicated faculty, splendid
physical facilities, and promising students? My advice must
be meager and unsatisfactory. Of one thing I am confident,
however; no true achievement or security will be gained by
simply playing it safe. When the landscape is rocking there
is no refuge to be found behind stone walls. Educational
policy in the law schools during the closing years of this
century is likely to become increasingly pragmatic,
consciously experimental. We shall have to distribute our
eggs among many baskets. This is true because the needs we
serve are altering and we do not yet know very clearly what
form they will take and, in any event, the demands on legal
education will become increasingly numerous and diverse.
It seems likely, therefore, that if the law school is to flourish
as part of the university, or even survive, the law school
must become an even more pluralistic community than it
has yet become. This is not an entirely comfortable prospect
because it is likely to disturb the sense of organic unity that
is experienced when persons are joined in a common
undertaking with similar views about their purposes and
employing similar techniques. Members of the law school
community will be called upon, therefore, to express a new
spirit of tolerance, a tolerance not founded on indifference
or gained by suppressing critical judgment, but one which
survives contentions and debate because based on mutual
respect and on a poignant awareness of the fallibility, in
times like ours, of the individual's capacity for
understanding.
Let me not depress you unduly with my forebodings .
Surely the prospects for service and satisfactions are great
as the twentieth century turns. True, there are probably few
of us able to look about our world and attain the level of
exaltation expressed by Julian of Norwich: "But all shall be
well and all shall be well and all manner of thing shall be
well." Perhaps we should aspire to a mood and morale
located someplace be tween that extreme and the drunken
don's castigation of the nature of things. In the meantime,
let me wish this school good fortune as it continues the
intricate search to discover who we are and what we ought
to be.

Francis A. Allen
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